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Abstract
We model the settlement of a legal dispute when the trial outcome depends on the behav-
ior of a strategically motivated judge. A defendant, who is uninformed about the level of harm
that he has caused, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an informed plaintiff. If the parties cannot
agreeon a settlement and the case goes to trial, the judge decides how much effort to exert in dis-
covering the actual damages. We show that under very general assumptions this model exhibits
multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, the judge exerts less effort and more cases settle out of
court, whereas in others the opposite occurs. We also show that the judge prefers the low effort
equilibria with high settlement rate and argue that a "managerial judge" could easily steer the
parties towards low effort equilibria. This may be deemed undesirable since in low-effort equi-
libria, the terms of the settlement heavily favor the informed plaintiff, and this in turn induces
over-investment in ex ante preventive care by the defendant.
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There is a substantial literature on pretrial settlement, but only a few papers explicitly model the trial
stage and fewer yet examine the role of the trial judge. A typical game-theoretic analysis assumes
thatthere is asymmetric information about damages (or liability, or both)at the settlement stage, but
the truth will come out at the trial, perhaps with some exogenously speciﬁed probability.1 In reality,
how much is learned during the trial depends on many factors and the trial judge is one of the most
important. Our main contribution is to model the behavior of the trial judge and its effect on pretrial
settlement. More precisely, we assume that the probability of discovering the truth depends on how
much effort the judge expends during trial and that she chooses her effort strategically.
In our model, a plaintiff who knows the actualdamages thathe sufferedsues a defendant. During
the pretrial settlement stage, the defendant, who is uninformed about the level of damages, makes
a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff rejects this offer, the case goes to
trial and the judge awards damages that she deems appropriate. The judge is initially uninformed
about the actual damages but she learns the true value with some probability, which increases in her
(costly) effort during trial. We assume that she cares about accuracy so that if she discovers the true
value, she awards that amount, while if she remains uninformed, she awards the expected damages
(afterupdatingherpriorbeliefsusing thefactthatthecase hascome to trial).2 The basic tradeoffthat
the judge faces is simple: effort is costly but it increases the accuracy of her decisions.
Weﬁrstestablishthattheequilibriumsettlementofferbytheuninformeddefendantishigher,and
hence more cases settle, when the judge is expected to exert lower effort at trial. This simply follows
from the fact that the parties would fail to settle only if they are asymmetrically informed about the
trial outcome. Since only one of the parties knows the true value of the damages, the degree of this
asymmetricinformationincreasesasthejudge’s decision becomesmore accurate. In fact, aswe show
lateron, whatreallymattersisnothow close thejudge’sawardtothetruevalueofdamages, butrather
how sensitive it is to changes in that value.
We fully characterize the set of equilibria and show that the model has generically multiple equi-
libria. This is a novel feature and the intuition is as follows: If the litigants expect high effort from the
judge, then more cases go to trial. This means that the variation in damages among the tried cases is
large and hence the uninformed judge is likely to make a large error in assigning damages. Therefore,
she will indeed have an incentive to exert high effort. Similarly, low effort becomes self-sustaining
because in that case fewer cases go to trial and the judge can not err too much, and this diminishes
her incentives for effort.
We also show that the judge and the informed plaintiff are better off in the low effort (and high
settlement rate) equilibria whereas the uninformed defendant is better off in the high effort (and low
settlement rate) equilibria. In low effort equilibria, the variance of damages among the tried cases is
small, which implies that the judge will make small mistakes in awarding damages. Therefore, she
avoids exerting too much effort and obtains a high payoff. In contrast, in high effort equilibria fewer
1The best-known models are the screening model of Bebchuk (1984) and the signaling model of Reinganum and Wilde
(1986). Both models study ultimatum bargaining games in which either the plaintiff or the defendant has privateinforma-
tionaboutdamages or liability. Formodels withtwo-sided asymmetric information,seeFriedmanand Wittman(2006) and
Daughetyand Reinganum (1994).
2In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the litigants have a passive role at the trial. Friedman and Wickel-
gren (2010) investigate a settlement problem similar to ours where the plaintiff can exert effort at the trial to increase his
probability of winning.
1cases settle and hence the judicial errors can be large. Therefore, she exerts high effort, but if she
still remains uninformed she also ends up making larger errors. This implies that she obtains a lower
payoff.
We argue that these results are quite relevant for the ongoing debate on the so-called ‘manage-
rial judges,’ i.e., judges who get actively involved in the pretrial stage, presumably to promote and
encourage settlement over trial. Schrag (1999) observes that the “proponents of managerial judging
identify abuse of the pretrial discovery privilege as a main cause of both high litigation costs and the
slow resolution ofdisputes. Judgescanimproveoutcomesbyinterveningintheearlieststagesoflegal
disputes.” But there is also a drawback.3 As Resnik (1982) pointed out, the “judges are acting more
forcefully. [...] Some warn the parties that the judge would take a dim, and possibly hostile, view
of either side’s insistence on going to trial.” Our results suggest that the judge would indeed like to
get involved in the pretrial settlement stage and signal that she will select the low equilibrium effort.
Even if this signal takes the form of cheap-talk, i.e., simple announcements or hints, it will succeed
in selecting the low effort equilibrium. Furthermore, such an announcement is “self-signaling” and
“self-committing,” i.e., the judge would make this statement if and only if it is true and she would in-
deed want to choose low effortif it is believed. Therefore, there is a verystrong reason forthe litigants
to believe this announcement and behave according to the low effort equilibrium.4
Even a small degree of self interest on the part of the judges, therefore, can have an enormous
impact on settlement rates above and beyond the more commonly considered factors, such as the
degree of asymmetric information, the size of the trial awards, the magnitude of trial costs, discovery
rules, etc. Furthermore, as we indicated above, higher settlement rates come with signiﬁcant distri-
butional implications, which is precisely the concern raised in Fiss (1984) and Resnik (1982). It might
be true that legal disputes are resolved at lower cost when they are settled out of court, but the terms
of the settlement usually favor the party with the informational advantage. Therefore, there may be
good reasons to try and limit judicial involvement in the pretrial bargaining stage.
There are few other papers in which the trial outcome is dictated by an imperfectly informed
judge who rationally updates her beliefs when the case comes to court. But there is no model in
which she herself chooses how much information to have.5 Daughety and Reinganum (1995) model
the settlement stage as an ultimatum bargaining game in which the informed party is the proposer.
If the case goes to trial, the judge learns the true damages with an exogenously speciﬁed probability,
if not, she must infer it from observable actions of the plaintiff and the defendant.6 Kim and Ryu
(2000) studya similar problem using ascreening model (the uninformedpartyis theproposer) where
the judge is assumed to receive a noisy signal about damages.7 Finally, Rasmusen (1995) studies
a plaintiff’s decision to bring suit when the court assesses true damages with an exogenous error.
Anticipating that such errors will inﬂuence the pool of plaintiffs who go to trial, the court adjusts the
awardaccordingly, thedirection ofwhich dependsonwhethertheerrorispredictablebytheplaintiff.
3Resnik (1982) and Fiss (1984) are the two widely cited papers against this type of “managerialism.”
4See Farrell and Rabin (1996) on the credibility of pregame cheap-talk messages and a discussion of “self-signaling” and
“self-committing.”
5For models in which the judge makes systematic errors, see Hylton (2002) and Landeo, Nikitin and Baker (2006).
6They show that if the judge can observe the plaintiff’s settlement demand, then she uses that information, and this
feeds back into the settlement process, resulting in the plaintiff making demands to inﬂuence the judge. As the judge’s
dependenceon such informationincreases (i.e., as the probabilityof learningthetruthdecreases), moreand more types of
the plaintiff pool by making a high demand.
7They ﬁnd that when the judge observes the defendant’s offer, the plaintiff rejects a larger set of offers in order to inﬂu-
ence the judge’s subsequent beliefs to his advantage.
2The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 analyzes the
case with exogenous judicial error. In Section 4 we endogenize judicial error by allowing the judge to
become better informed by exerting a costly effort. In Section 5 we discuss the policy implications of
our analysis. Section 6 contains some discussion about the possible generalizations and extensions
of our model and Section 7 concludes. All the proofs omitted in the main text are in Section 8.
2 The Model
We present a simple model of litigation under strict liability in which a risk-neutralplaintiff claims to
be harmed by a risk-neutral defendant.8 We let θ ∈ [θ,θ] denote the actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff and assume that only the plaintiff knows θ, whereas the defendant has probabilistic beliefs
about it. We represent his beliefs by a probability distribution function F, with density f > 0 and full
support on [θ,θ]. The parties have the option of settling the issue among themselves, but if they fail
to do so, the case goes to trial where the court decides on a settlement.
A trialiscostly forboth parties. Welet cp >0andcd >0denote thesecosts fortheplaintiffand the
defendant,respectively.9 Duetotrialcosts, thepartieshavesomeinterestinsettlingtheissuethrough
private negotiations. These negotiations can take many forms and the outcome may depend on the
bargaining protocol assumed, especially when the parties have asymmetric information. We employ
averysimple andcommonly usedmodel andassume thatthe(uninformed)defendantmakesatake-
it-or-leave-it settlement offer s ≥0 to the (informed) plaintiff, who either accepts or rejects it.10 If the
offer is accepted, then the payoffs of the plaintiff and the defendant are s and −s, respectively. If it is
rejected, then the case goes to trialand the court decides on the amount thatthe defendantmust pay
the plaintiff.
The court is represented by a judge who has the same prior belief about θ as the defendant and
cannot observe its true value unless she expends costly effort. In particular, if she exerts an effort
level e ∈[0,e] at trial, she learns the true value of θ with probability p(e), but incurs a cost of c(e). We
assume that p(e)and c(e)are twice continuously differentiable andstrictly increasing functions such
that p′(e) is ﬁnite for all e >0, p′′ ≤0, and c′′ >0.
We interpret effort as the amount of deliberation and mental energy the judge devotes to the
case and c(e) as the opportunity cost of this deliberation. The amount of deliberation that goes to
a given case is an important judicial decision and this view of judicial behavior is in line with the
ﬁndings from a number of recent studies. For example, Bainbridge and Gulati (2002) argue that the
judges “commonly rely on rules of thumb–decision making heuristics and shortcuts,” rather than
applying“thecomplex modes of legal reasoning.” The studyof trialjudges byGuthrie, Rachlinski and
Wistrich (2007) also emphasizes the costly deliberation vs. intuitive decision making trade-off. In
their view, judges are “predominantly intuitive decision makers,” and we need to recognize “both the
importantroleofthejudicialhunch,andtheimportanceofdeliberationinconstrainingtheinﬂuence
of intuition which is generally more likely than deliberation to lead judges astray.”
8Risk neutrality assumption is made only for the ease of exposition. Our main results would go through with minor
modiﬁcations if the parties were instead risk-averse.
9These costs are incurred regardless of the trial’s outcome.
10Spier (1992) considers a ﬁnitely repeated version of this model and shows that if all costs are borne at trial, then the
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the single-offer model. In Section 6 we comment on how our results change under
different bargainingenvironments.
3We assume that the judge is impartial and suffers a disutility if the amount she awards to the
plaintiffdivergesfromthetruedamages.11 Thisdisutilityisgivenby−α(θ−a)2,where a istheamount
awarded to the plaintiff and α>0. Her payoff function therefore is given by
uj(a,e,θ)=−α(θ−a)2−c(e) (1)
This speciﬁcation is fairly common and there are several ways to motivate it (cf. Ryu and Kim
(2000) and Daughetyand Reinganum (1995)). For example, it could be that with some probability the
court’sdecision willbeappealedandthetruevalueofθ willberevealedatahighercourt. Ifthejudge’s
reputation depends on the frequency with which her decisions are overturned, she would indeed try
to minimize the distance between her award and the true value of θ. (See Shavell (1995) for more on
this.)
The optimal award for the judge is the expected value of θ given her information about θ. If she
observes θ, then this is equal to θ itself, whereas if she remains uninformed, it is the conditional
expectation calculated from her prior beliefs and the equilibrium strategies of the plaintiff and the
defendant in the bargaining game. In any case, she never awards an amount smaller than θ, and in
order to rule out the possibility that the plaintiff may drop the case if settlement fails, we assume
that cp < θ.12 Finally, we assume that the judge cannot observe the defendant’s offer in the pretrial
settlement bargaining game and all of the above is common knowledge.13
The equilibrium concept that we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which we will sometimes
refer to simply as the equilibrium. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each player’s strategy must be
optimal given the information she has and the equilibrium behavior of the other players, and each
player’s beliefs must be updated using Bayes rule, whenever possible.
To facilitate a better understanding of our results, we decompose our analysis into two different
sections. We will ﬁrst analyze the pretrial bargaining assuming that there is a ﬁxed probability with
which the judge learns the true value of damages. Afterwards, we will endogenize this probability by
making it the outcome of the judge’s costly effort choice.
3 Pretrial Bargaining under Exogenous Judicial Accuracy
In thissection we assume thatthe judge learnsthe truevalue of θ with some exogenously given prob-
ability q ∈[0,1], known to the litigants, whereas with probability 1−q, she has the prior beliefs given
by F, which she updates by taking into account the fact that the case has come to trial. Therefore,
with probability q she awards θ and with probability 1−q she awards some amount w that is optimal
given her beliefs. We assume that the judge updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Therefore, if trial probability is positive in equilibrium, then w is equal to the conditional expecta-
tion of θ using the prior and the fact that the plaintiff has rejected the defendant’s offer. If, on the
otherhand, trialdoes not occur in equilibrium, then Bayes’ rule does not apply and hence the judge’s
beliefs on θ can be speciﬁed arbitrarily, i.e., w can be speciﬁed as an arbitrarynumber in [θ,θ].
Suppose that the uninformed defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer s ≥ 0. If the
11This is also similar to Usman (2002) in which the judge needs to exert a costly effort to verify whether the defendant in
a contractual dispute has fulﬁlled his obligations.
12See Nalebuff (1987) for an analysis of a model in which this conditiondoes not hold.
13In Section 6 we comment on what would happen if the judge could observe the offer.
4plaintiff has damages θ and accepts this offer, his payoff is s, whereas if he rejects it, his expected
payoff is −cp +qθ+(1−q)w. Therefore, he accepts an offer s if s ≥ −cp +qθ+(1−q)w and rejects
otherwise.14
If q =0, thenthe trialoutcome is common knowledge and the partieshavean interest in avoiding
trial costs. Indeed, if q = 0, then there is a continuum of equilibria in which all cases are settled
without a trial (see Proposition 1). More interesting cases are with q >0. So let q >0, and deﬁne
t(s)=

   
   
θ, s <−cp +qθ+(1−q)w
s+cp−(1−q)w
q , −cp +qθ+(1−q)w ≤ s ≤−cp +qθ+(1−q)w
θ, s >−cp +qθ+(1−q)w
(2)
Given the offer s, t(s) is the marginal (or the threshold) plaintiff type such that all plaintiffs with
damages θ > t(s) reject the offer s. Therefore, the case is settled with probability F(t(s)) and the
defendant pays s. With probability 1−F(t(s)), the case goes to trial and the defendant pays his share
of the trial cost as well as the expected award by the judge. The latter is equal to θ with probability











In equilibrium, the defendant chooses s to maximize (3). In general, he may choose an offer
so that the probability of trial is equal to zero. This would, in turn, render the beliefs of the judge
and hence the value of w indeterminate. Proposition 1 shows that this happens if and only if q ≤
ct f (θ), where ct = cd +cp denotes the sum of the litigants’ trial costs. It is also easy to show that
the equilibrium with positive trial probability is unique. The comparative static properties of the
equilibrium are easily proved if F exhibits the monotone hazard rate property(MHRP), which we will
from now on assume to be the case.






We can now prove










t(s∗) y f (y)dy
1−F(t(s∗))
(5)
14We assume, withoutloss of generality, that he accepts when indifferent.
5(b) If q ≤ ct f (θ), then there is an equilibrium for each w ∈ [θ,θ] such that the equilibrium offer is
s∗ =−cp +qθ+(1−q)w and the trial probability is zero.
This result states that if the court is accurate enough so that q > ct f (θ), then in equilibrium the
settlement offer is such that a positive, but less than one, fraction of the plaintiffs go to trial. This







In equilibrium, plaintiffs with θ > θ(ct/q) go to trial whereas those with θ ≤ θ(ct/q) settle, which
implies that the settlement rate is equal to F(θ(ct/q))∈(0,1). (See Figure 1).
We should note that (4) is the well-known condition in Bebchuk (1984), except that the left hand
side here is multiplied by 1/q. The intuition is also similar (See also Spier (2007)): The optimal offeris
found by equating the marginal beneﬁt to marginal cost. The beneﬁt of a small decrease in s is equal
to F(t(s)), which is the probability that the offer will be accepted. But a decrease in s also raises the












The marginal plaintiff type t(s) is indifferent between accepting the offer s and going to trial, which
implies that at trial he expects to receive s +cp. By lowering s slightly, the defendant makes that type
go to trialandends uppaying cp more thanwhathe would havepaid if he were to offer s. In addition,
the defendantends up incurringtrialcosts himself, which is equal to cd. Therefore, the marginal cost











plaintiff settles plaintiff goes to trial
Figure 1: Equilibrium under Exogenous Judicial Accuracy
When the case goes to trial and the judge learns the true value of damages, the defendant pays
θ. If the judge does not learn θ, then the defendant pays w(ct/q), which is equal to the expected
damages, given that all tried cases have damages greater than θ(ct/q), i.e.,
w(ct/q)=
 θ
θ(ct/q) y f (y)dy
1−F(θ(ct/q))
(7)
6The equilibrium offer is given by
s∗(ct/q)=−cp +qθ(ct/q)+(1−q)w(ct/q) (8)
If, on the other hand, q ≤ ct f (θ), then there is a continuum of equilibria, one for each w ∈ [θ,θ],
in which the offer is −cp +qθ+(1−q)w and the case is settled with probability one.
An interesting question is the effect of a decrease in the accuracy of the court and an increase in
thecostoftrialonthelikelihood ofpre-trialsettlement. If q ≤ct f (θ), adecrease intheaccuracyofthe
court, q, leaves that likelihood unchanged, i.e., all cases are settled. A more interesting comparative
statics result is obtained when q >ct f (θ).
Proposition 2. If q > ct f (θ), then a decrease in q (a increase in ct) leads to an increase in settlement
rate, the equilibrium offer, the expected award to the plaintiff at trial, (ex ante) expected payoff of the
plaintiff, and a decrease in the expected payoff of the defendant.
Lower accuracy promotes settlement simply by reducing the “asymmetric information” between
the defendant and the plaintiff. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Daughety and Reinganum(1995)
obtain a similar result, albeit in different models. In these papers, the proposer is the informed party
in the settlement stage, whereas in our model it is the uninformed party. In spite of this difference,
it turns out that, in the separating equilibrium that they focus on, the trial probability is increasing
in the accuracy of the court.15 There are two other papers, Hylton (2002) and Landeo, Nikitin, and
Baker (2006), that consider the impact of court errors on the probability of settlement. They are “life-
cycle litigation” models hence not comparable to ours. Nevertheless, we should note that they reach
different conclusions. Hylton ﬁnds that court errors have an ambiguous effect on settlement rates
whereas Landeo et al. ﬁnd that errors increase settlement rates, which is in line with our result.16
Remark1. Wehavemodeled theprocessthatallows thecourttoawardmoreaccuratedamagesas“all
or nothing”. An alternative, and more general, speciﬁcation would allow the judge to receive a noisy
signal about the actual damages and use this together with her prior beliefs and the fact that the case
has come to court in choosing the award amount. In order to capture such cases let ν(θ) denote the
optimal award by the judge if the true value of damages is θ. In the model we use in the paper, this is
given by ν(θ)= qθ+(1−q)w. Then, for anyoffer s such that −cp +ν(θ)≤ s ≤−cp +ν(θ) we can deﬁne
the threshold type t(s) implicitly as
s =−cp +ν(t(s))
and the defendant’s expected payoff would be
V(s)=−F(t(s))s −[1−F(t(s))](cd +E [ν(θ)|θ ≥ t(s)]).






15As we mentioned in Introduction,the important difference between these papers and ours is that we later endogenize
the accuracy by making it the outcome of the judge’s effort choice.
16Thereis a largeliteratureon accuracy in adjudication(See Kaplow 1994). Fora recent contributionto thedebate onthe
efﬁcacy of the negligence rule vs. strict liability under court errors, see Ackermann (2010).
7which is the counterpart of the condition (4). This also makes it clear that what is important is not
accuracy of the award, i.e., how close the award is to θ per se, but rather how responsive the award
is to changes in actual damages. In other words, the fraction of cases that settle depends not on how
much the parties think they will be ordered to pay (or receive) in court, but rather on how sensitive
they think the award is to actual damages.
4 Equilibria with Judicial Agency
In this section we assume that if the judge expends effort e she observes θ with probability p(e), in
which case she chooses to award θ, and obtain a payoff of −c(e). If she remains uninformed, which
happenswith probability 1−p(e), she sets the award equal to the expected value of θ, using her prior
beliefs given by F and the equilibrium strategies of the plaintiff and the defendant in the bargaining






where var(θ) is the conditional variance of θ, calculated using the judge’s posterior beliefs.
The previous section has analyzed the equilibrium of the bargaining game for exogenously given
accuracy, q. Alternatively, we could think of q, as the common belief of the defendant and the plain-
tiff about judicial accuracy, i.e., their belief about the probability that the true damages will be estab-
lished at trial. In this section, this probability is determined endogenously in equilibrium. If e∗ is the
effort level that the judge expends in equilibrium, then e∗ must maximizeUj(e) given q, and q must
be equal to the equilibrium level of accuracy, i.e., q = p(e∗).
4.1 Equilibria with no Trial
Our ﬁrst observation is that there is a continuum of equilibria in which the effort choice e∗ of the
judge is such that p(e∗)≤ f (θ)ct, or equivalently e∗ ≤e, where
e = p−1(f (θ)ct). (9)
In any such equilibrium the probability of trialis zero (see Proposition 1). Therefore, the information
set of the judge is off-the-equilibrium path and her beliefs cannot be determined by Bayes’ rule. In
other words, in these perfect Bayesian equilibria, we are free to choose any distribution of θ as the
judge’s beliefs. In particular, we could choose the distribution so that the variance derived from that
distribution satisﬁes the following condition
α(p(e)−p(e∗))var(θ)≤c(e)−c(e∗), for all e ∈[0,e],
which makes it optimal for the judge to choose e∗ ≤e.
We should note that such equilibria exist only if
p(0)< f (θ)ct, (10)
i.e., if the judge does not show any effort, probability of discovering the truth is small enough. If this
8condition does not hold, e is either not well-deﬁned (or equal to zero) and the presentation of our
results becomes cumbersome. Therefore, from now on we assume that (10) holds.
4.2 Equilibria with Trial
More interesting are equilibria in which e∗ > e, so that a positive fraction of the cases go to trial (see
Proposition 1). Lettingthe accuracy of the judge be q, plaintiffswith θ ≤θ(ct/q) settle (where θ(ct/q)
is as deﬁned in equation (6)) and plaintiffs with θ >θ(ct/q) go to trial. For each value of q, the condi-






where w(ct/q) is the expected damages for the pool of cases that go to trial, as deﬁned in equation
(7).







which is deﬁned forall e >e. By exertingeffort,the judge increases the probability of being informed,
which, in turn, increases her payoff. For an arbitrarily given conjecture q about the judicial accuracy,
the marginal beneﬁt of this is equal to αp′(e)v(ct/q). The marginal cost, in turn, is given by c′(e).
In equilibrium, we have q = p(e). Therefore, Φ(e) measures the net marginal beneﬁt of an arbitrary
effort level e >e, assuming that the litigants believe that the judge indeed exertsthis level of effort.
If Φ(e∗) < 0, then e∗ cannot be an equilibrium, since the judge would be strictly better off by
choosing a smaller effort level.17 If, on the other hand, Φ(e∗) > 0, then e∗ cannot be an equilibrium
unless e∗ = e. It is easy to see that any e∗ such that Φ(e∗) = 0 is an equilibrium. More formally, we
have:
Proposition 3. An effort level e∗ >e is an equilibriumif and only if Φ(e∗)=0 or Φ(e∗)>0 and e∗ =e.
Note thataseffortlevel e converges to e, the threshold level of damages θ(ct/p(e))converges to θ,
i.e., fewer and fewer cases go to trial. Therefore, theconditional variance v(ct/p(e))converges to zero
as e converges e. Together with our assumptions on p(e) and c(e), it easily follows that
lim
e→eΦ(e)<0. (13)
We furthermake the following assumption
Assumption 2. There exist e such that Φ(e)>0.
Then, the following result easily follows from the continuity of Φ and the intermediate value the-
orem.
Corollary1. There exist at least two equilibriawith effort level greater than e.
17A smaller effort level exists since e >0 by assumption (10).
9This is an interesting result and has important implications. Due to judicial agency, whenever
there is an equilibrium in which some cases go to trial and the judge exerts some effort to learn the
true value of damages, then, regardless of the legal costs, degree of asymmetric information, the dis-
tribution function, etc., there always exists a second equilibrium in which less effort is exerted by the
judge. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
























plaintiff goes to trial
Figure 3: Bargaining Under Judicial Agency
Aninteresting question is which one of theseequilibria do theplayers preferex ante? The ranking
for the plaintiff and the defendant directly follows from Proposition 2: The informed plaintiff prefers
the low effortand the uninformed defendantprefers the high effort equilibrium. The following result
states that the judge is better off in the low effort equilibrium.
Proposition4. Thejudgeandtheplaintiffprefertheloweffortequilibriawhereasthedefendantprefers
the high effort equilibria.
In the Introduction we have provided an intuitive explanation of this result. The proof is simple
and uses a revealed preference argument. Consider two equilibria, one with low and the other with
high effort. First, low effort must be a better response than high effort when the variance of the tried
cases is calculated using low effort, since otherwise low effort would not be an equilibrium choice.
Second, convexity of the cost function and concavity of the probability function imply that at the
high effort equilibrium, the variance of the tried cases must be larger, since otherwise higher effort
wouldnotbeoptimal. Sinceforaﬁxedeffortlevelthepayoffofthejudgeisdecreasinginthevariance,
these two facts establish that she prefers the low effort equilibrium.
The following example provides a closed form solution and illustrates many of the points made
so far. In fact, Figures 2 and 3 correspond to this example.
EXAMPLE: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION AND QUADRATIC COSTS
Let θ be uniformly distributed over [0,1], p(e)= e and e = 1, and the cost of effort be c(e)= e2/2.
For a given common conjecture held by the litigants about the trialaccuracy level q >ct, equilibrium







































Equilibria are characterized by the behavior of the following function which is obtained from the
preceding equation when we substitute p(e)≡ e for q, that is, when we impose the condition that in










Note that e = ct and that lime→ct Φ(e) = −ct < 0. Therefore, by Proposition 3, an equilibrium e∗ > e
exists only if Φ(e) = 0 has a solution ct < e ≤ 1. This will be the case if and only if α/ct ≥ 81. If this
inequality holds strictly, then there exist two equilibria, one of which has a lower effort level and a
higher settlement rate.
Figure2hasbeendrawnforα=12and ct =0.1, inwhich case thetwo equilibrium effortlevelsare
given by e∗
1 ≈0.17 and e∗
2 ≈0.75 with corresponding settlement rates of 0.59 and 0.13, respectively.
4.2.1 Comparative Statics
Figures 2 and 3 also help us understand the effect of changes in various aspects of the environment
that surrounds settlement negotiations and judicial behavior. Any change that increases the judge’s
marginal beneﬁt of effort or decreases the marginal cost leads to an increase in equilibrium effort, as
long as the marginal beneﬁt curve intersects the marginal cost curve from above at equilibrium, or
Φ′(e∗) < 0. If, on the other hand, Φ′(e∗) > 0, then we obtain exactly the opposite result. Therefore,
depending upon the sign of Φ′(e∗), we can unambiguously sign the effect of exogenous changes in α,
p′, and c′. Effects of an exogenous change in ct or the function p depend on whether the conditional
(truncated)variancefunction v(ct/p(e))ismonotonicornot. Ingeneral, themonotonicityproperties
of truncated variances are well-known only for log-concave densities: If θ has a log-concave density,
11then v(ct/p(e)) is decreasing in ct/p(e).18 We obtain the following result, whose proof is obvious and
hence skipped.
Proposition5. Iftheequilibriumeffortchoicee∗ issuchthatΦ′(e∗)<0(Φ′(e∗)>0), thenthefollowing
changes lead to an increase (decrease) in equilibriumeffort level:
1. An increase in α
2. An exogenous increase in p′
3. An exogenous decrease in c′
If f is log-concave, then we can add the following to the above list:
1. A decrease in ct
2. An exogenous increase in p
Remark 2. As Samuelson (1947) observed, and called it the “correspondence principle”, there is an
intimate relationship between the stability properties of an equilibrium and its comparative statics.
Although our model is static, the following is a plausible dynamic model
˙ e =αp′(e)v(ct/e)−c′(e),
since one would expect the judge to increase his effort if marginal beneﬁt of doing so is greater than
the marginal cost, and conversely. A steady state of this differential equation is an equilibrium of our
model and is asymptotically stable only if
Φ′(e)≤0,
which is to say that the slope of the marginal beneﬁt curve is smaller than the slope of the marginal
cost curve. Therefore, one may conclude that comparative static results reported in Proposition 5 are
reliable only for the case in which Φ′(e∗)<0.
5 Policy Implications and Welfare Properties
In this section we will discuss a few of the potentially important policy implications of our results.
Wewill ﬁrst revisit the debate on the managerialjudges (who promote settlement over trial)and then
discuss the effects of limiting judicial discretion over how much effort to exert. In the last subsection,
we will discuss some of the welfare implications of our results.
5.1 ManagerialJudges and the Social Desirability of Settlement
There is an ongoing debate about the social desirability of settlement over trial. One view is that set-
tlementreplaces acostly trialandthereforesavesvaluable resources and improves theaggregate wel-
fare. The opponents of this view, Galanter (2004) among others, emphasize the negative implications
18If, instead, thedensity is log-convexand hassupport[a,∞), thenthetruncatedvarianceis increasing. See, forexample,
Heckman and Honoré(1990). Manycommonly used distributions,such as theuniform,normal, exponential distributions,
are log-concave.
12of high settlement rates. One such implication is that out of court settlements further disadvantage
the weak partyin the dispute by forcing them to accept a settlement at unfavorable terms(see Resnik
(1982)andHadﬁeld(2004)). Indeed, ourresultsshow thatequilibriawithhighersettlementrateshave
both high settlement offers and trial awards, which hurts the uninformed defendant. In that sense,
high settlement rates have some negative distributional consequences.
Furthermore, our results show that the judge is better off in equilibria with high settlement rates.
Thisisallthemoreimportantinthelightoftherecentreportsthatmoreandmorejudgesactivelypur-
sue strategies that promote settlement over a full trial.19 In her classic paper, Resnik (1982) pointed
out that “many federal judges have departed from their relatively disinterested pose to adopt a more
active, ‘managerial’ stance. In growing numbers, judges are [...] meeting with parties in chambers to
encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation.” Our results suggest a bleaker
picture: In the presence of multiple equilibria the judge may act as a coordination device and direct
the litigants towards the equilibrium that she prefersthe most, i.e., towards settlement. This will save
resources by more quickly resolving disputes but at the cost of resolving them in a more inaccurate
and perhapsunfair way.
5.2 Limitingthe Effort Choices of the Judge
As we have just discussed, one negative implication of judicial agency is that if the judge exerts low
effort, then more cases settle at unequal terms. In other words, in the equilibrium with low judicial
effort, the settlement effectively robs the uninformed party of his right to a fair trial. Therefore, the
policy makers might want to take measures to prevent judges from choosing low effort at the trial
stage. Suppose thatsuch measures makeit impossible for thejudge to choose an effortlevel less than
em.
In order to understand the possible effects of such a constraint, consider an example with linear
cost of effort and uniform distribution of θ, which is illustrated in Figure 4. As can be seen from this
ﬁgure, when thereare no constraintson effortchoice, therearetwo equilibria, one in which thejudge
exerts the maximum effort level, e, and another one in which she chooses effort level e∗. Suppose
now that the judge has to choose an effort level of at least em, where e < em < e∗. Note that this
minimum effort requirement is lower than both levels that would be equilibrium effort levels, and
hence one may conjecture that it will have no effect.20 However, and in contrast to this intuition, this
lower bound emerges as a new (and stable) equilibrium effort level.21 Therefore, in the presence of
judical agency, a naive attempt to enforce higher effort by limiting judicial discretion, creates exactly
the opposite effect unless the standard imposed is sufﬁciently severe.
5.3 Welfare
InProposition 4weestablished thatthejudgeandtheplaintiffpreferthelow effortequilibria whereas
the defendant prefers the high effort equilibria. If we deﬁne social welfare as the sum of the payoffs
19See Galanter (2004) section IX, Resnik (2000), (2004), Gensler (2010), and Thornburg(2010).
20One may also wonder why such a lower limit is imposed in the ﬁrst place, if the rationale is to eliminate the low effort
equilibrium e∗. A possible explanation is that the environment is more complicated than we assumed; For instance, the
exact value of e∗ could be uncertain.
21To see this note that at effort level em, the marginal beneﬁt is less than the marginal cost of effort. Therefore, the judge
would want to lower her effort, but since she is already at the lowest permissable effort level, she cannotdo so.







Figure 4: Limiting Effort Choice
of the three parties involved, then this result and the fact that the total payoff of the plaintiff and the
defendant decreases in trial probability, imply that low effort equilibrium is better for social welfare.
The analysis is slightly more involved if the social welfare function puts some weight on how ac-







where, asbefore, s isthe settlement offer, t(s)themarginal plaintifftype thatacceptsthe offer,F(t(s))
the probability of settlement, and γ ∈ [0,1] represents the weight put on by the society on accuracy.
Settlementwill be valued bysuch a society because it lowers thecost of trialct +c(e)but will be costly
because it has lower accuracy. Therefore, if γ is high enough, then the society will prefer the high
effort equilibria, whereas if γ is low, low effort equilibria will be preferred.
Thereare also incentive effectsthatneed tobe takeninto account in a welfare analysis. For exam-
ple, suppose that accidents can be prevented if the defendant takes sufﬁcient care at an earlier stage.
Let x denote the level of ex ante care, φ(x) the cost of care, and r(x) the probability that an accident
will occur given the level of preventive care. Then we can write the social welfare function as22
−φ(x)−r(x)[E(θ)+(1−F(t(s)))(ct +c(e))].
If the judge exerts too little effort at the trial, then most cases settle but the settlement amounts are
very large. The low trial probability improves the social welfare. However, high settlement awards
make the defendant overinvest in preventive care and this reduces social welfare. Therefore, if pre-
ventive care is too sensitive to the expected payments at the litigation stage, and trial costs are not
22Here wefollow thestandard approachin formulatinga social welfare functionwith threecomponents: the cost of care,
the expected harm, i.e., the unconditional expectation of θ, and the expected trial costs, which includes the trial costs of
the litigants as well as the effort cost of the judge. See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) and Shavell (1999).
14too large, then high effort equilibria are better. Otherwise low effort equilibria are better for social
welfare.
6 Extensions
Nearly all the models in the literature, including ours, model the pretrial settlement stage as a “take-
it-or-leave-it” (or ultimatum) bargaining game. As Friedman and Wittman (2006), and many others,
haveobserved “[t]hiscreatesvastly differentoutcomes, dependingon which side makesthe (ﬁrst) of-
fer.” Anotherissuethathasbeendiscussed intheliteratureistheobservabilityofthesettlementoffers
by the judge. In this section we discuss if and how our results change under alternativespeciﬁcations
of the model.
PLAINTIFF-OFFER GAME
Assume that the plaintiff is the uninformed party and makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” settlement
demand from the informed defendant. In such a model our main results would carry over with slight
modiﬁcations. In particular, the settlement rates would still be inversely related to the trial accuracy
(andhence theamountof judicial effortattrial), andthere would still be multiple equilibria. Also, the
uninformed party, who is the plaintiff this time, would still be worse off in the low effort equilibria.
The difference would be that the equilibrium settlement demands by the uninformed plaintiff would
become smaller as the judge exerts less effort.
SIGNALING GAME
Anotherpossible variationistoswitch toasignallinggameinwhichtheinformedpartymakesthe
settlement offer. If we assume that the plaintiff is the informed party, then we obtain a model similar
to the one in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Daughety and Reinganum(1995). In the separating
equilibrium of such a model, the trial probability increases in judicial effort, just like in our model.
Furthermore, the probability that the offer made by a plaintiff of type θ is rejected increases in θ,
which implies that if the case comes to court, then a Bayesian judge should interpret this as θ being
higher (compared with her prior beliefs). This is also in line with our results. The only difference is
that in such a signaling model, if the case comes to court, entire belief distribution of the judge shifts
so that the posterior dominates (in a ﬁrst order stochastic sense) the prior, whereas in our model
the posterior is just a truncated (from left) version of the prior distribution. This changes how the
posterior variance of θ is calculated and the judge’s equilibrium effort, but we conjecture that our
qualitative results would not change.23
OBSERVABLE OFFERS
Especially withtheincreasing involvementofjudgesatearlierstagesof litigation, itishighly likely
that the judges will learn about settlement demands and offers. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence
suggests that in some cases the judge herself suggests the settlement terms. We can show that our
mainresultscontinuetoholdbuttheequilibriumtrialprobabilityishigherwhenthesettlementoffers
areobservable. Thisisinlinewiththeresultsofearlierpapersthatstudiedthisissue, albeitindifferent
settings, namely Daughety and Reinganum (1995), and Kim and Ryu (2000).
23Iftheinformedpartyis thedefendant, whoalso makes theoffer, thenthetrialprobabilitywould still increasein judicial
effort but if the case comes to courtthe judge would interpret this as θ being small.
157 Concluding Remarks
Surveying the pretrial settlement bargaining literature, Daughety and Reinganum (2008) note that
“most models [...] either ignore the role of the attorneys, the experts to the litigants, and the court,
which is usually taken to be a judge or a jury, or relegate them to the background.” In most models
there is asymmetric information about damages or liability (or both) between the litigants, which
will then be resolved at the trial stage, possibly with some errors. There are models where the trial
outcome depends on the actions of the litigants but no model allows for the judge to take a private
and costly action that becomes a key factor in determining the outcome. Our work focuses on this
aspect of the litigation process.
We have used a very standard (and basic) bargaining protocol and added a minimal element of
strategic behavior on the part of the judge: She needs to exert a costly and discretionary effort to
correctly resolve the dispute but otherwise is neither corrupt nor has any bias for either party. This
has led to signiﬁcant new results concerning the workings of the pretrial bargaining system. First,
we discovered that the model hasmultiple equilibria, with different welfare implications. Second, we
argued that a judge who does not care about the fairness of pretrial settlement, may lead the others
to coordinate on the equilibrium in which she exerts less effort at trial. This leads to high settlement
rates at unequal terms to the disadvantage of the uninformed party.
We have left out many other aspects of the litigation process, such as the discovery stage, that we
believe would be better understood by allowing judges to be strategic actors. We hope to study these
issues in the future.
8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Weﬁrst show thatin anyequilibrium θ < t(s∗)<θ. Suppose, for contradic-
tion, that t(s∗) = θ. Then, s∗ = −cp +qθ+(1−q)w, since otherwise the defendant can decrease the






the defendant can increase his payoff by reducing the offer by some amount. This proves that t(s∗)<
θ. Now suppose that t(s∗)=θ. Then, −cp +qθ+(1−q)w is an equilibrium offer as well. Again, since





the defendant can increase his payoff by increasing his offer by some amount.
Therefore, 0 < t(s∗) < 1, which in turn implies that the solution to the maximization problem of
the defendant, s∗, is in the interior of an interval:
−cp +qθ+(1−q)w < s∗ <−cp +qθ+(1−q)w.





which is equivalent to (4).













Continuity of the function F/f and the intermediate value theorem then implies that there exists a







Uniqueness easily follows from the monotone hazard rate property.
(b) First, assume that q = 0 and suppose, for contradiction, s∗ < −cp +w. Then, this offer is re-
jected with probability one and the defendant’s equilibrium payoff is −cd −w. But, the defendant
can instead offer −cp +w +c2/2, which would be accepted with probability one and lead to a strictly
greater payoff. Similarly, s∗ > −cp + w cannot be an equilibrium offer either, since otherwise the
defendant can decrease the offer by some small amount and improve his payoff. Therefore, in equi-
librium s∗ = −cp + w. Furthermore, this offer must be accepted with probability one. To see this
suppose that it is rejected with probability σ > 0. This leads to a contradiction, since the defendant
can offer −cp +w +σct/2, which would be accepted with probability one and lead to a payoff that is
strictly greater than the equilibrium payoff of −(1−σ)(−cp +w)−σ(cd +w).
Now, assume that 0 < q ≤ ct f (θ). We can establish that t(s∗) > θ as in part (a). If t(s∗) < θ, then














which contradicts that q ≤ ct f (θ). Therefore, t(s∗) = θ and s∗ ≥ −cp +qθ+(1−q)w. But, s∗ > −cp +
qθ+(1−q)w leads to a contradiction since the defendant can decrease the offer a little and increase
his payoff. This establishes that s∗ =−cp +qθ+(1−q)w and the trial probability is zero.
In both cases, q > 0 and q = 0, there is an equilibrium for any w ∈ [θ,θ], in which the equilib-
rium offer is −cp +qθ+(1−q)w, the trial probability is zero, and the judge believes that θ = w with
probability one if the case comes to trial.
Proof of Proposition 2. Take any q > ct f (θ) and consider q′ < q. Denote the equilibrium offers at q′
and q, by s′ and s, respectively, and note that, by Proposition 1, equilibrium settlement probability
at q is F(t(s)) ∈ (0,1). Suppose ﬁrst that q′ ≤ ct f (θ). Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium set-
tlement probability at q′ is one and we are done. Therefore assume that q′ > ct f (θ) and suppose, for












contradicting the monotone hazard rate property. Therefore, we conclude that F(t(s′)) > F(t(s)).




θ y f (y)dy
1−F(θ)
(14)





because ω(θ) > θ for any θ < θ. Since the expected award w(ct/q) is equal to ω(θ(ct/q)) and θ(ct/q)










We can write the expected payoff of the defendant in terms of an arbitrarysettlement probability




y f (y)dy −(1−q)w(ct/q) (15)
where we take into account of the fact that in equilibrium w is a function of ct/q. The defendant
maximizes this function with respect to s, and hence indirectly with respect to t. Since we showed
that the solution to this maximization problem is in the interior, the derivative of this function with
respect to t, when evaluated at the equilibrium, is identically equal to zero. Applying the envelope





Expected payoff of the plaintiff is equal to
−Ud(t,q)−(1−F(t))ct
Since equilibrium t is decreasing in q and F is increasing, derivative of this function with respect to q
is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3. “Onlyif”parthasalreadybeenprovedintheparagraphprecedingProposition
3. To prove the “If” part let Φ(e∗)=0 and consider the following strategies and beliefs. Let the judge’s
effort choice be e∗, her beliefs be given by conditional distribution of θ given that it is greater than
θ(ct/p(e∗)), and heraward when uninformedbe w(ct/p(e∗)). Given her beliefs, thisaward is optimal
and her payoff function is given by
Uj(e)=−α(1−p(e))v(ct/p(e∗))−c(e)
18Since this function is strictly concave and
U′
j(e∗)=αp′(e∗)v(ct/p(e∗))−c′(e∗)=Φ(e∗)=0
by hypothesis, e∗ is the unique maximizer of Uj(e). The case where Φ(e∗) > 0 and e∗ = e is proved
similarly.
Proof of Proposition 4. Lower effortequilibria have lower accuracyand hencefor theplaintiffand the
defendant the result follows from Proposition 2. To prove the result for the judge let eH > eL be two
equilibrium effort levels and vH and vL be the corresponding equilibrium variances, i.e.,
vH = v(ct/p(eH)), vL = v(ct/p(eL)).













as the judge’s payoff for an arbitraryeffort level e and variance v. Then, the following is true
uj(eL,vL)>uj(eH,vL)≥uj(eH,vH)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact uj is strictly concave and eL is an equilibrium effort
level. Therefore, eL constitutes a unique best response by the judge to vL. The second inequality
follows from the fact that uj is decreasing in its second argument.
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